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Purpose – This paper provides unique empirical findings exploring the impact of the UK’s post-
Brexit Economic Strategy to boost trade with developing countries on the UK banking sector’s 
ability to manage trade-based money laundering risks. 
Design/methodology/approach - Exploratory research design that utilised structured literature 
review, followed by semi-structured interviews with key subject matter experts employed by large 
UK banks. 
Findings – Both banks and law enforcement struggle to prioritise TBML intelligence discovery 
due to deficient skills, resources, technology, and lack of strong regulatory stimulus. The regulated 
sector calls for the UK Anti-Money Laundering (AML) reform that would better incentivise 
TBML deterrence, yet the Government underestimates the money laundering risks while trading 
with high-risk jurisdictions post-Brexit.  
Research limitations/implications - The findings are based on a small sample of six semi-
structured interviews with difficult to access population of key subject matter experts. Despite the 
small sample, participants provided well-articulated and informed insights.
Practical implications - The UK’s post-Brexit Economic Strategy to boost trade with developing 
countries downplays the TBML risks it carries. The findings should alert UK banks, law 
enforcement, and the Government who will collectively bear the responsibility to effectively 
manage TBML while enabling smooth trading.   
Originality/value - The research provides unique perceptions of UK banks’ senior subject matter 
experts on managing TBML threats from opportunistic criminals. 
Keywords - Brexit, Proceeds of Crime, Trade-Based Money Laundering, UK Banking, Risk, Risk 
Perception, Risk Management, Regulation, Compliance, Organized Crime
Paper type - Research paper






























































Page 3 of 20 Introduction
Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) is used to move illicit value through trade 
transactions. Global Financial Integrity (2017) estimates that approximately 87 per cent of illicit 
financial flows from developing countries, between 2005 and 2014, were accomplished 
through this method. Despite the prevalence of the threat, trading with that block forms an 
important part of the UK Government’s Economic Recovery Strategy post-Brexit. 
Transparency International (2017) confirms that the UK will face new corruption risk 
by increasing trade with developing countries. Lord Ricketts, a former national security 
adviser, stresses further that the Britons’ safety will worsen with the loss of access to many vital 
European crime databases (Sabbagh, 2020). Even organized crime rings admit that the 
reshaped UK trade landscape creates opportunistic conditions for their illicit cross border 
activities (Marinetto, 2018). 
The HM Treasury (2017) shares the concerns by calling TBML the greatest area of risk to the UK 
economy due to the vast sums of criminal funds passing undetected through complex UK corporate 
vehicles and offshore jurisdictions. UK banks, by the nature of processing billions of pounds for 
those entities, are perceived as best suited to spot illegitimate trade activities of their customers. 
While a lot of research has been done on how Brexit would boost opportunities for British 
businesses, not much has been written on its potential TBML prevention impact. Majority of the 
literature centres on defining TBML methods, policies to drive regulatory reforms, and ways to 
empower countries' Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The perspectives of the UK banking 
compliance departments are voiced in various general publications such as articles and 
governmental reports, but academically researched knowledge remains underrepresented. 
To expand the knowledge, the author conducted qualitative research by interviewing senior TBML 
experts currently or previously employed at UK banks and holding the responsibility to mitigate 
banks' propensity to criminal abuse.
This paper provides unique empirical findings exploring the impact of the UK Economic Strategy 
to boost trade with developing countries on the UK banking sector’s ability to mitigate trade-based 
money laundering risks.  The researcher identified three main findings, which together present 
unique insights into UK banks’ readiness to deter opportunistic TBML. The participants expressed 






























































 Senior Trade Processing Manager
 Two Senior Intelligence Officers with policing background
 Senior TBML Training Provider to banks, law enforcement, and the regulators
Page 4 of 20resources, technology, and lack of strong regulatory stimulus. The regulated sector calls for 
the UK Anti-Money Laundering (AML) reform that would better incentivise TBML deterrence, 
yet the Government underestimates the risks associated with trading with high-risk jurisdictions 
post-Brexit.  
Methods
In order to meet the exploratory research purpose, the interpretivist paradigm appeared as the most 
suitable philosophical stand to inform the research design. Kumar, Talib and Ramayah (2012) 
advise using the interpretivist exploratory research design when a researcher deals with new 
complex matters, and wants to better familiarise oneself with the studied topic. Subsequently, 
qualitative methodology of a structured literature review followed by semi-structured interviews 
was utilised to obtain multidimensional perspectives. 
The author successfully interviewed six TBML subject matter experts. Such senior 
banking compliance professionals typically work at financial institutions' FIUs departments that 
deal with highly sensitive data. Moreover, a deep level of expertise required to meet the demands 
of the job makes those teams relatively small in size. Consequently, nonprobability snowball 
sampling technique was used to gain access to the participants. 
Due to the coronavirus social distancing restrictions phone calls were picked as the primary 
engagement method.  The author designed an interview schedule for consistency in wording and 
the sequencing of the questions. Although deviations from the schedule happened often, 
depending on the respondents’ experience, some level of standardisation helped in observing 
patterns in responses. 
Despite the findings being based on a small interview sample, they do provide well-articulated 
and informed insights. All participants obtained higher education, were professionally certified 
in the AML domain and had at least 15 years on the job experience across many large UK banks.  
Some had lengthy career backgrounds spanning across law enforcement and banking, thus were 






























































 Senior Compliance Investigator for complex cases with law enforcement background
 Head of Compliance and Financial Crime Risk Strategy
Constructing a representative sample of people who are affected by a very distinctive problem is 
difficult. Including those with more generic AML understanding, rather than deep TBML 
knowledge, could make the findings biased towards people with lower domain knowledge and 
render the findings not valid. Further, Crouch and McKenzie (2006) point that in order for a 
researcher to gain unique perspective on complex subjects, one must build fruitful relationships 
with respondents what can only be achieved with small samples.
Most interviewees were willing to share very sensitive information, as long as their anonymity was 
ensured. The researcher decided to delete any sensitive information that was judged as potentially 
damaging to the persons or organisations mentioned during the interactions.  
The researcher found thematic analysis as the most appropriate method to uncover themes and 
patterns in response. Braun and Clarke (2013) confirm that the technique is good for small research 
projects of 6–10 participants. The transcription process allowed the author to gain good 
understanding of the data collected and to code the responses based on keywords such as risk, 
regulators, compliance framework, operations, law enforcement, and Brexit. Analysis of each 
revealed subthemes that focused around the regulatory framework criticism, its negative impact 
on UK banks’ TBML knowledge, resources and technology, as well as the UK Government’s 
oblivious attitude towards the TBML risks with developing countries. The author has also searched 
for an overarching sentiment with which the responses were provided. Many participants revealed 
strong frustration with the existing approach to TBML detection. Their quotes are included in the 
paper to help the readers understand the interviewees’ prevailing emotions.  
TBML Problem Overview 
Prevalence
TBML is “the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of 
trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illicit origins…frequently used in combination 
with other money laundering techniques to further obscure the money trail” (FATF, 2006, p. i). Its 
use became more attractive with the growth of world trade that in 2018 was valued at $20 trillion 
(Byrne, 2020). The United Nations (2020) point, however, that the coronavirus outbreak and 






























































 Gold, precious metals, and minerals
 Auto parts and vehicles
 Agricultural products and foodstuffs
 Clothing and second-hand textiles
 Portable electronics (mobile phones, laptops, etc.)
The World Wildlife Fund (2020) expands the list to include companies trading in natural resources 
such as timber, live animals, and fish.  Fish is a striking topic given its central role in the UK-EU 
Brexit negotiation process. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2020) stats that illegal fishing is worth between 
$10-23.5 billion annually for the transnational criminals who use fishing vessels not only to move 
fish, but also drugs, firearm, animals, and trafficked human beings. National Crime Agency, for 
example, arrested 72 people in November 2020 on a 30-metre fishing boat off the coast of Great 
Yarmouth in East Anglia in a people-smuggling investigation (Reuters, 2020). 
Page 6 of 20changing trade relationships between many countries are expected to contract the global economic 
growth for some time.
The Europol (2020) stresses that despite the expected recession, organized criminals will thrive 
by exploiting vulnerable people and businesses.  Italian Mafia, for example, has already 
approached cash struggling businesses with candid offers to pull them through the 
economic instability (Tondo, 2020). We can expect some of those businesses to eventually 
resurface as vehicles in complex trade-based money laundering schemes. 
One of Italy's most respected anti-mafia prosecutors, Nicola Gratteri, warns about the UK’s role 
in facilitating international movement of the illicit funds (Forster, 2017). He points that 
post-Brexit, British trade bureaucracy and complex corporate structures will become even more 
popular as vehicles for the sole purpose of processing dirty money (Forster, 2017). 
Susceptible Industries and Businesses with Particular Focus on Fishing
FATF (Financial Action Task Force) and Egmont Group (2020) caution that any business could 






























































Page 7 of 20 Opportunistic criminals are expected to take advantage of the new UK-EU trade deal that already 
creates economic disadvantages for many fishermen. For example, Scottish fishermen in fear for 
their future earning could fall prey to criminals wanting to use their boats and high seas 
knowledge in exchange for an alternative income (BBC, 2021). The risk of that happening is 
rather high. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2020) highlights that due to the 
uncoordinated cross-border policing initiatives, the finishing industry is considered as low 
risk and high-profit environment for criminals. The organisation, therefore, strongly advocates 
for the increased focus on identifying organised crime groups who both commit predicate 
offences on the water and those who profit from those activates (The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2020)
Susceptible Trade Finance Products with Particular Focus on Open Account Trade
UK Banks are also instrumental vessels in facilitating international trade by not only processing 
billions of pounds in associated transactions but also by offering a variety of trade finance options. 
Cowdell (2015) grants special attention to an open account trade method, also known as buy-now-
pay-later agreements, that finances 80 per cent of the global trade despite being most vulnerable 
to money laundering. Soudijn (2014) explains that with such arrangement, the buyer and the seller 
agree on a clean or netting payment through the banking system without the need for burdensome 
documentation detailing the purpose of the transaction or all the involved actors. 
The Bankers Association for Finance and Trade (2017) advises banks to pay special attention to 
open trade transactions involving developing countries. FATF (2020) adds, however, that telling 
good transactions from the bad demands an impossible task of obtaining customer verification data 
residing in regions with strict data privacy laws, poor money-laundering controls, or lacking in 
international cooperation. Furthermore, those payments are typically spread across many global 
financial institutions making the TBML detection for an individual bank very difficult (FATF, 
2020).
Ineffective TBML Prevention Approach 
Timely suspicious activity identification, however, is mandated on all the regulated institutions 
under the global AML requirements. Failure is punishable with large fines and potentially 
tarnished reputation. For example, Danske Bank A/S is expected to be fined $2 billion by 
authorities in Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom for being used in Europe's 































































Page 8 of 20Large banks take the risk of being implicated in such scandals very seriously, thus each 
spends around $500 million a year to mitigate money laundering (KPMG, 2020). A large portion 
of that spend goes towards advanced regulatory compliance technologies, such as know your 
customer onbarding, watchlists and sanctions screening, ongoing customer due diligence, 
transaction monitoring, holistic customer profiling, and analytics tools that 
include artificial intelligence/machine learning, network analytics, and natural language 
processing. 
As innovative as those solutions sound, their functionality is inherently limited by the uncertainty 
around the regulatory approval. Vendors, in fear of getting the expectations wrong, rarely propose 
concepts that challenge the current compliance approaches. SAS (2019), one of the leading AML 
technology provider, explains that while machine learning models are fantastic at finding money 
laundering patterns, their output has been considered too complex for non-techy regulators to 
understand and thus accept as better compliance practise. 
Such conservative attitude towards bold AML ideas, however, empowers criminals to run free. 
According to the International Monetary Fund, the money laundering economy is worth close to 
five per cent of the world’s gross domestic product (Weeks-Brown, 2018).  The Europol (2017) 
and the European Parliament (2018) further point out that about one per cent of the criminal 
activities are ever spotted, reported, and criminal profits confiscated. Faced with those gloomy 
statistics, the European Banking Federation urgently calls for more progressive thinking aimed at 
AML approach redesign (Wass, 2020).
The Main Findings 
TBML Engine: Small/Medium-Import/Export Business 
The participants were asked about their personal experiences with detecting and deterring TBML 
under the existing AML regulatory framework. All pointed towards the difficulty in identifying 
the crime as it spans across numerous global predicate offences such as fraud, human trafficking, 
drug trade, terrorism financing, and capital flight. They expressed particular concerns with 
monitoring small and medium-size companies trading with Asia, Latin America and Sub-Sahara 
regions that are known for large illicit outflows.
Participants highlighted that the added challenge rested with the inadequate number of relationship 






























































Page 9 of 20
senior trade processing manager, said that “only large customers would have a dedicated account 
manager. Medium to small businesses would have one that serves hundreds of other clients”.  
Participant 2, a head of compliance and financial crime risk strategy, expanded that those 
small/medium businesses might not even have a dedicated account manager, but only a call centre 
number.  In those situations, a bank representative would rarely talk to the same person in a 
business, rendering building up a profile of a customer impossible; a dream scenario for any 
criminal. 
Interviewees provided many TBML examples involving small/medium import/export companies 
with origins in developing countries that traded with the West. All agreed that the best way to 
launder money was to use those businesses on open account trade terms to avoid scrutiny. 
Participant 1 confidently said: “I would simply go into my bank with payment instruction, referring 
to an invoice number and a date…If I was worried about inspection, I might get forged invoice 
from my supplier”.  Participant 5, a senior TBML training provider, further noted that even if a 
suspicion was raised, a customer would simply go to another bank. 
Banks are discouraged, however, to exit those risky relationships. The interviewees highlighted 
that small/medium-import/export companies play a very important role in facilitating global 
economic development and the regulators expect banks to simply apply better monitoring 
techniques. 
Detection Challenges
All participants agreed that spotting TBML demands cross-departmental collaboration ranging 
from account managers, trade processing staff, and financial intelligence units of compliance.  
Each possesses a unique outlook that can be strengthened with knowledge sharing and training. 
The difficulty, however, rests in taking staff for training without impacting their targets and key 
performance indicators (KPIs). Participant 1 pointed that “finding suspicious activities is never 
one of the KPIs”.
The banking compliance employees were generally considered more knowledgeable about TBML 
then the law enforcement investigators. The participants blamed deficient budget, resources, time, 
and constantly changing Home Office objectives as big contributing factors. “There isn’t [simply] 






























































Page 10 of 20
investigator, who left law enforcement  due to the frustrating lack of focus on investigating 
economic crimes.  
Others confirmed that the most knowledgeable AML workforce was now employed in the private 
sector with much better pay and career progression. They also pointed that Brexit and post 
coronavirus budgetary austerity was expected to further deepen the skill gap and thus negatively 
impact law enforcement’s ability to tackle economic crimes. The participants agreed that banks, 
therefore, ought to expect further burden with policing TBML and its predicate offences.  
Defensive Reporting
The interviewees pointed that banks felt more incentivised by the Government’s AML regulations 
to protect themselves against fines and reputational damages, than to deter criminal behaviour. 
They explained that this approach resulted in banks filing defensive suspicious activity reports 
(SARs) that simply overload law enforcement with low-quality information. Frustrated Participant 
3, a senior intelligence officer, expressed that “a hot and heavy breath of the regulator down the 
back of the people working in compliance advisory and investigations pushes them to defensive 
SAR reporting”.
Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) was mentioned as a more effective 
approach to detecting and deterring TBML. JMLIT is a partnership between law enforcement and 
financial institutions to exchange intelligence relating to high-end money laundering schemes 
which are complex, multi-institutional, and multi-jurisdictional (NCA, 2020). Participant 4, a 
senior intelligence officer, called JMLIT as a “ground breaking idea …that make banks much more 
dynamic in interacting one with another around suspicious activities”. Participant 3, also senior 
intelligence officer, emphasised that “the cases and SARs that come of JMLIT are far higher in 
quality than from any individual bank, but they are currently just a drop in the ocean of more than 
400,000 SARs reported by UK entities”. 
Call to Change the Approach
Conversations on the JMLIT framework revealed, however, that most banks were very reliant on 
law enforcement to alert them to TBML threats despite their poor expertise on the subject. Naheem 
(2018) confirms that in many cases, without initial law enforcement involvement, the banking 






























































Page 11 of 20
Unit relies heavily on local law enforcement and the Europol to highlight potential TBML case 
(Naheem, 2018). 
The practice was called peculiar by a few participants. They explained that law enforcement did 
not have the skills or resources to prioritise TBML investigations and would rather go after easier 
crimes that contribute to targets for successfully closed cases. Participant 2 said that “TBML is 
just too costly to investigate and even harder to prosecute”. 
Some participants expressed frustration with the banking sector's constant reliance on law 
enforcement to feed them intelligence on the investigated cases. Participant 2 stressed that “we 
cannot prosecute enough people to change the world… The problem exists because there is high 
demand and it makes too much money… change [that] paradigm, and you win”. Participant 4 also 
resounded the sentiment by noting that many banks engage in one way conversations with law 
enforcement where they only ask for specific intelligence on certain customers. They could be, 
rather, more proactive in their approach by working with law enforcement to build a bigger picture 
of the criminal network they could be unknowingly banking.
Perspective on the UK Government’s Attitude towards Money Laundering Challenges 
The UK Government appears to be less convinced with the need to change the current AML 
prevention approach. Many participants attributed the attitude to the UK’s glowing 2018 FATF 
mutual evaluation report. The country was described as having a well-developed and robust regime 
to effectively combat money laundering and terrorist financing (FATF, 2018). Some participants 
expressed strong disappointment with those results. They critiqued that FATF narrowly focused 
on assessing if AML frameworks and legislations were in place, and not if they were effective. 
Frustrated Participant 6 pointed that “it was as if you were reading about a different country…that 
is not what happens here… who managed to convince the people doing the evaluation and show 
them that it works?… of course it does not!”. Transparency International (2018) also challenged 
the FATF assessment by calling out the UK’s notorious failures in preventing £100 billion in illicit 
funds impacting the country each year.
In its 2019 report on economic crime, the Treasury Committee (2019) also urged the UK 
Government to take a tougher stand in the fight against economic crime, particularly as the UK 
enters trade negotiations with high-risk countries post-Brexit. The Government is yet to provide a 
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Negative Brexit Impact 
The topic of Brexit impact on TBML caused unease amongst the participants. They were 
particularly concerned with the UK Government agencies’ losing access to the European crime 
databases. Morris (2020) confirms that under the new UK-EU trade deal, the security co-operation 
would no longer be based on "real-time" access.  Sharma (2020), adds that membership in Europol, 
Eurojust, and the European Arrest Warrant would be suspended. Casciani (2020) further stresses 
that losing those rights is very detrimental to the UK law enforcement who, for example, use just 
the Schengen Information System around half a billion times every year.
Most interviewees anticipated that the economic crime prevention topic would not get much 
attention during the initial UK-EU trade deal negotiations. Worried Participant 2 stated that 
“asking for more resources or extra budget has always been a very difficult conversation…with 
the recession and Brexit combined, it is now going to become even harder”.  Participant 3 pointed 
that Brexit and post coronavirus recession was going to push the Government to further 
deprioritize the economic crimes prevention, particularly when risky business brings money into 
the country.  
Boris Johnson’s plan to establish ten free trade zones to aid the economic recovery was listed as 
one example of the Government’s potential relaxing attitude towards dirty money.  Free trade 
zones benefit from different customs duties and supervision to the rest of a country’s territory 
making policing criminal activity harder (Basquill, 2020).  The participants articulated that banks 
played a crucial role in ensuring the smooth flow of the business through trade zones, but 
burdening them with extra AML regulations would make it too expensive for the banks to service. 
Participant 2 explained that “[AML regulations] are counterintuitive to stimulating business from 
those zones”, and Participant 3 added that “AML will [therefore] take a second place of an 
afterthought”.
Positive Brexit Impact
Some participants, however, saw Brexit as an opportunity for the UK Government to take a firmer 
stance on protecting the country from money laundering schemes. They pointed that the UK, in 
response to the new data access limitations and weakened international investigation assistance, 






























































Page 13 of 20
Participant 3 compared the current AML approach to a "blame game" explaining that law 
enforcement blames banks for poor quality reporting, banks blame the regulators for restrictive 
covenants in detecting crimes, regulators blame FATF for their narrow regulatory guidelines that 
influence the European AML Directives. The participant summarised that "we make sure that 
everybody has somebody else to blame. I cannot change because they cannot change", 
Tom Keatinge (2019) form RUSI particularly critiques FATF as one of the intuitions responsible 
for the ineffective global compliance measures. He expanded that FATF failed at applying its own 
mantra of a ‘risk-based approach’ and assessed all countries with the uniform framework against 
the AML requirements and not how effective they were in detecting the crime (Keatinge, 2019).  
As part of the necessary UK AML approach redesign, the country could champion change in the 
way evaluations are done on large economies whose AML failures carry global consequences.  
Keatinge (2019) agrees that a more effective method would be to conduct a higher frequency of 
targeted reviews on systemically important jurisdictions such as the UK. Naturally, this would put 
more spotlight on the country’s AML measures, but also highlight practical improvements 
delivering better results that could be replicated by other global financial centres. Further, insights 
derived from such approach would help prioritise emerging risks and prompt collaboration with 
the developing jurisdictions on addressing the predicate crimes before further engaging in trade.
Conclusion and Recommendation
The HM Treasury considers TBML as the greatest area of risk to the UK economy due to the vast 
sums of undetected criminal proceeds passing undetected through the UK banking system. A large 
portion of those funds originates in the developing countries with which the UK plans to strike 
new trade agreements post-Brexit. The Government appears, however, to downplay the associated 
risk assuming that the country’s current AML regime is fit to withstand the threat. 
The researcher conducted a small-scale pilot study to explore the impact of the UK Economic 
Strategy to boost trade with developing countries post-Brexit on the UK banking sector’s ability 
to mitigate trade-based money laundering risks. 
The author applied interpretivist paradigm to inform the exploratory research design that utilised 
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The literature revealed that little has been written on the impact Brexit might have on the UK 
banks’ TBML deterrence preparedness, however, it did provide a good background to 
understanding the potential scale and the underlying causes of the problem.  
TBML gained popularity due to the growth of the world trade and despite the contracting global 
economic output, triggered by Brexit and coronavirus pandemic, criminal enterprises are still 
predicted to thrive. The UK is highlighted as a major enabler for their illicit growth due to the 
country’s bureaucracy and ease in setting up complex corporate structures.
Criminals have a vast array of businesses and sectors that they could readily use for their TBML 
schemes. Fishing industry does not appear like an obvious choice, but it is frequently used by 
transnational criminals to move various illegal goods across borders. The sector’s attractiveness is 
predicted to increase due to the new UK-EU trade deal that threatens fishermen on both sides with 
big financial loses. Criminals could seize the opportunity to exploit fishermen’s vulnerable state 
by offering an alternative deployment of their boats and the high seas knowledge.  
Banks are yet another important vessel in moving goods around. They not only enable secure 
processing of the associated transactions but also help to finance trade. The vast majority of 
international trade is financed on open account terms due to the convenience and limited 
documentation required. The same benefits, however, make it particularly difficult for UK banks 
to effectively deter money laundering abuse. 
To better understand those challenges and the Brexit impact, the author interviewed senior subject 
matter experts currently or previously employed at large UK banks. 
All participants pointed towards the difficulty in identifying the crime on open account terms. They 
expressed particular concerns with monitoring small/medium-import/export companies trading 
with regions known for large illicit outflows. Lacking strong regulatory stimulus to manage TBML 
risks paired with poor knowledge, resources and technology added to the challenge for both banks 
and law enforcement alike. 
Participants called for a regulatory change that would better incentivise prioritising TBML 
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The UK Government, however, seems to trust that the country’s money laundering prevention 
functions well and Brexit is not a concern.  The interviewees worried further that the looming 
recession would only push the Government to continue to deprioritize money laundering 
prevention, particularly when risky business brings money into the country.  
Some participants, however, saw Brexit as an opportunity for the UK Government to take a firmer 
stance on money laundering prevention. The country, being an important financial centre, could 
redesigning its regulatory approach that not only protects the UK, but also guides other global 
financial markets in developing more effective controls. For example, conducting a higher 
frequency of targeted AML effectiveness reviews could provide insights on how to prioritise 
emerging risks and prompt collaboration with the developing countries on addressing predicate 
crimes before further engaging in trade.  If done well, it could prompt other global financial centres 
to replicate the approach; the approach where large economics facilitate international growth in 
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